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Introduction
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) oversees nearly every aspect of the $11 billion college sports industry. 1 Its powers include scheduling championship events, determining eligibility rules, entering into commercial contracts, and punishing members that refuse to follow its authority. 2 In recent years, some NCAA members have become increasingly wealthy-grossing annual revenues upwards of $100 million per year. 3 Yet the NCAA's rules deprive these members of the opportunity to share their wealth with student-athletes. 4 Instead, the NCAA and its leaders hide behind a "veil of amateurism" that maintains the wealth of college sports "in the hands of a select few administrators, athletic directors, and coaches." 5
1.
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984) (explaining that, since the NCAA's inception in 1905, the NCAA has "adopted and promulgated playing rules, standards of amateurism, standards for academic eligibility, regulations concerning recruitment of athletes, and rules governing the size of athletic squads and coaching staffs"); see also Where Does the Money Go?, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCA A/Answers/Nine+points+to+consider_one (accessed by entering the URL in the Internet Archive index) (stating that "[o]verall annual revenue for college athletics programs for 2008-09 was estimated at about $10.6 billion"). , available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/p-4322-2013-2014-ncaa-division-imanual.aspx (prohibiting, as part of the criteria for amateur status, individuals from receiving various forms of "pay" in return for "athletics skill or participation"); see also David Wharton, Plan Is on the Money to Some: Conferences Will Have Option of Giving Student-Athletes an Extra $2,000 a Year, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2011, at C1 (quoting Boise State University President Robert Kustra's position that, even though student-athletes are unpaid, they "have it pretty good"); NCAA Office of the President, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/NCAA+Presiden t/NCAA+President+Mark+Emmert (last visited Sept. 27, 2013) (quoting NCAA president Mark Emmert's declaration that "[a]s long as [he is] president of the NCAA, [it] will not pay student-athletes to play sports").
See infra

5.
Amy Although the NCAA rulebook has long evaded legal scrutiny, courts are finally beginning to overturn certain aspects of the NCAA's rules that are deemed to be anticompetitive. For example, courts have struck down the NCAA's nationwide limits on televised football broadcasts and its caps on assistant coaches' salaries. 6 Nevertheless, the need to reform the college athletics industry extends far beyond these areas. It is not just the outer fringes of the NCAA rules that violate antitrust law: it is the whole shebang.
This Article explains why the NCAA's no-pay rules violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. Part I introduces the NCAA, its principle of amateurism, and its traditional enforcement mechanisms. Part II provides a brief overview of section 1 of the Sherman Act-the "comprehensive charter of economic liberty" in American trade. 7 Part III, applying precedent from the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit, explains why the NCAA no-pay rules constitute both an illegal form of wage fixing and an illegal group boycott. Part IV then explores eight lower court decisions that incorrectly held the NCAA eligibility rules were noncommercial and thus exempt from antitrust scrutiny. Meanwhile, Part V analyzes four additional lower court decisions that misconstrued the NCAA eligibility rules as procompetitive under a rule of reason review. Finally, Part VI concludes that even if a court were to find that competitive balance is a reasonable basis for upholding certain no-pay rules, such rules still should not be promulgated by the NCAA, but rather by the individual conferences.
I. The NCAA, Its Principle of Amateurism, and Its
Internal Enforcement Mechanisms
A. The NCAA
The NCAA is the "dominant trade association" of American colleges that compete in intercollegiate sports. 8 approximately twelve hundred member schools that participate in ninety-five different active athletic conferences. 9 Its mission is to promulgate playing rules, host championship events, enforce standards of academic eligibility, and promote the general growth of college athletics. 10 The NCAA was first chartered in 1905 by trustees of sixty-two colleges as a forum to discuss health risks in college sports. 11 But by the end of World War II, the NCAA had expanded its reach into hosting sporting events and setting eligibility rules. 12 In 1948, the NCAA introduced its first written code to govern members' recruiting practices and financial aid payouts. 13 Then, four years later, the NCAA replaced that code with a broader set of rules to govern membership, infractions, and punishment. 14
9.
See Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 957 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the NCAA's membership includes more than twelve hundre colleges); About the NCAA: Membership, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/ public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/membership+new (last updated Aug. 13, 2012) (stating that there are a total of 95 active NCAA conferences in Division I, Division II, and Division III sports); see also Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 99 (1984) (defining the NCAA as "an association of schools which compete against each other to attract television revenues, not to mention fans and athletes").
10. See Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 957 (explaining that the NCAA "promulgates rules and regulations" pertaining to college sports); see also Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1983) (describing the NCAA as "essentially an integration of the rulemaking and rule-enforcing activities of its member institutions"), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) ; Banks, 746 F. Supp. at 852 (explaining that according to the NCAA's constitution, its purpose is to maintain amateur athletics "as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body and by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional sports").
11. History, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, http://www.ncaa.org/ wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/About+the+NCAA/History (last updated Aug. 13, 2012).
See
Enforcement, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, http://web.archive.org/web/20130310042307/http://ncaa.org/wps/wcm /connect/public/ncaa/enforcement/resources/chronology+of+enforcement (last updated Jan. 21, 2013) (accessed using the Internet Archive index) (noting the NCAA's 1948 adoption of strict regulations and the establishment of an investigative committee).
13. See id. (describing the "Sanity Code" as "the first set of regulations with teeth").
14. See id. (explaining the creation and scope of authority of the Membership Committee and its Subcommittee on Infractions).
Today, the NCAA operates pursuant to a formal constitution and bylaws that are voted upon by its members. 15 In addition, NCAA members vote annually on committee members to "direct policy between [annual] conventions." 16 As a condition of membership, all NCAA colleges must agree to abide by the association's written rules, as well as by its committees' decisions. 17 Members do not have the chance to opt out of rules based on their financial preference, nor do they have the right to opt out on moral grounds. 18
B. The NCAA's Principle of Amateurism and Its Enforcement
One area in which the NCAA establishes rules pertains to the amateur status of student-athletes. The NCAA's principle of amateurism, as drafted and approved by its membership, states that "student-athletes shall be amateurs in intercollegiate sport, and their participation shall be motivated by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived." 19 As such, the NCAA bylaws limit the quantity of student-athletes' financial aid to an amount "set by the Association's membership." 20 In addition, NCAA bylaws prohibit student-athletes from accepting remuneration in any form based on their status as athletes. In modern times, the NCAA works tirelessly to enforce its principle of amateurism. 22 One way that the NCAA enforces this principle is by levying penalties against members that provide student-athletes with benefits beyond the NCAA-permitted amount. Such penalties may include fines, the loss of television appearances, or revocation of the opportunity to compete in postseason games. 23 In addition, the NCAA's most severe penalty-colloquially known as the "death penalty"-empowers the association to shut down any repeat violator's athletic program during regular-season competition. 24 Since the NCAA first established its death penalty in June 1985, the association has only enforced the sanction once, against Southern Methodist University's football team during the 1987 athletic season. 25 This sanction resulted in Southern Methodist University's dramatic loss of football-related revenues, not only for that particular season but also for many years that followed. 26 The economic annihilation of Southern Methodist University's football program continues to serve as a powerful deterrent against other colleges paying their studentathletes. 27
C. How Fear of the "Death Penalty" Has Chilled Student-Athlete Pay and Destroyed the Free Market for College Athletics to the Detriment of Consumers
In recent years, most NCAA members have fully abided by the NCAA's principle of amateurism, even though it has meant that college athletic directors and coaches earn millions of dollars while their student-athletes continue to live below the poverty line. 28 Even in the cases in which a particular athletic director or coach has wanted to improve his athletes' standard of living, the NCAA
See Michael Goodwin, N.C.A.A. Bans Football at S.M.U. for '87
Season, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1987, at A1 (noting that shortly after the NCAA sought to impose its death penalty, it seemed the sanction was intended primarily to ensure that a school would be denied "important sources of revenue").
27. See Ellis, supra note 22 (quoting Clemson University's Bill Atchley, who described the sanction as a "deterrent"); see also SMU INFRACTIONS REPORT, supra note 24, at 2-6 (noting that the sanction in which an NCAA member loses its ability to compete in a given sport is referred to as the death penalty and is intended to have a "deterrent value for others who might be tempted" to violate the NCAA rules, which held true in the SMU case because, once the threat of such sanction became recognized, there was "evidence of actions by the university to obtain full compliance with NCAA regulations"); N. amateurism bylaws serve as an impediment. 29 For example, in June 2011, seven Southeastern Conference football coaches proposed designating a share of their multimillion-dollar salaries to establish stipends of $300 per game for their student-athletes. 30 However, superiors at each school nixed the stipend plan in fear of the NCAA's rebuke. 31 The NCAA's continued failure to allow colleges to make independent business decisions about student-athlete pay hurts not only the student-athletes but also the college football consumers. 32 For example, if the seven Southeastern Conference colleges had not quashed their coaches' stipend plan, those colleges would have been able to use the stipends to recruit better players-producing a stronger on-field football product and thus leading to greater fan satisfaction. 33 Nevertheless, by complying with a zero salary cap, these colleges succumbed to the will of the majority and surrendered the opportunity to compete most effectively both on and off the field. 34 29. For further information on the NCAA amateurism bylaws and the enforcement of these bylaws, see supra Part I.B. 206, 211 (1990) (noting that if an individual NCAA member provides greater compensation to studentathletes than the NCAA-permitted amount, "it may attract better athletes, larger attendance, more lucrative television contracts, and greater national publicity"). But cf. Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2651 (1996) ("The extent to which a system of free-market bidding for players [in college athletics] would thus reshuffle the allocation of players among colleges is hard to determine, and it would be even harder to ascertain the extent to which the reshuffled deck would provide a better quality product for consumers.").
See Spurrier Proposes
34.
Cf. Goldman, supra note 33, at 226-27 (recognizing that a cap on college athlete compensation prevents schools from competing for student-athletes in a free market based on their internal resources).
II. An Introduction to Section 1 of the Sherman Act
The NCAA's principle of amateurism is long embedded in the history of college athletics; however, its concerted effort to destroy the free market for recruiting student-athletes is subject to scrutiny under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 35 Indeed, the principle's no-pay rules can reasonably be interpreted as the very antithesis to the type of competitive markets envisioned by drafters of the Sherman Act. 36
A. Overview
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, in pertinent part, states that "[e]very contract, combination [,] . . . or conspiracy, in the restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal." 37 This section of antitrust law provides "a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade." 38 It rests on the basic belief that "unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality, and the greatest material progress." 39 Read literally, section 1 of the Sherman Act would seem to prohibit all commercial contracts. 40 those contracts that "unreasonably" restrain trade. 41 To determine whether a restraint "unreasonably" restrains trade, a court will apply a two-part test. 42 First, the court will determine whether the restraint involves "concerted action between two legally distinct economic entities" in a manner that affects "trade or commerce among the several states" ("threshold requirements"). 43 If these threshold requirements are met, the court will then determine whether the alleged restraint unduly suppresses competition within any relevant market ("competitive effects test" Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 542 (2d Cir. 1993)); see also Sherman Act §1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (requiring that, to be illegal, the contract, combination, or conspiracy must be "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States"); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Mgmt., Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1971) ("Before a concerted refusal to deal can be illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, two threshold elements must be present: (1) there must be some effect on 'trade or commerce among the several States', and (2) there must be sufficient agreement to constitute a 'contract, combination . . . or conspiracy.'").
44. See Edelman, supra note 42, at 646 (explaining that the court will find a net anticompetitive effect "where the anticompetitive effects of a particular agreement are greater than their pro-competitive benefits"); see also Banks v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 850, 858 (N.D. Ind. 1990) ("Whether a particular arrangement violates the Sherman Act depends upon the arrangement's effect upon competition in the relevant marketplace.").
B. Threshold Requirements
In assessing the threshold requirements of an antitrust challenge, a court will often consider each requirement separately. 45 To determine whether a restraint involves the first threshold requirement-"concerted action between two legally distinct economic entities" 46 -a court will consider whether there is evidence of an agreement, either written or implied, between entities that lack a common objective. 47 This requirement compels plaintiffs to show the presence of an agreement that "deprives the marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking . . . and thus of actual and potential competition." 48 Similarly, to ascertain whether a restraint affects the other threshold requirement-"trade or commerce among the several States" 49 -a court will determine whether the restraint involves "the exchange or buying and selling of commodities especially on a large scale involving transportation from place to place." 50 Under a modern 45. See generally Edelman, supra note 42, at 642 (explaining that a reviewing court begins "its analysis by determining whether [the] two threshold issues are met"). view, the actual amount of interstate activity, as compared to intrastate activity, is irrelevant so long as "it is not insubstantial." 51 Thus, "almost every activity from which [an] actor anticipates economic gain" will be found to affect interstate commerce. 52
C. Competitive Effects Analysis
Presuming that both threshold requirements are met, a court will next review the restraint's competitive effects by applying one of three sanctioned tests: (1) per se, (2) rule of reason, or (3) quick-look. On one end of the spectrum, if a restraint is "so nefarious" that there is high probability that it lacks any redeeming value, a court will apply the per se test. 53 The per se test presumes that a restraint suppresses competition without engaging in any further inquiry. 54 Thus, a court will declare the restraint to be illegal unless a special antitrust exemption applies. 55 On the other end of the spectrum, if a court, upon first impression, believes that a restraint is likely to have some competitive benefit, it will instead apply the rule of reason test. 56 reason test "distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer's best interest." 57 It requires investigating every aspect of a restraint, including whether the parties to the restraint had the power to control any relevant market ("market power"), whether the restraint encourages or suppresses competition, and whether the restraint caused the marketplace "antitrust harm." 58 Finally, in the third set of circumstances, a court may elect to perform an "abbreviated or quick-look rule of reason analysis." 59 Under this third test, a court will probe into certain aspects of a restraint while relying on its initial presumptions about others. 60 Most courts that apply the quick-look test do so in favor of the plaintiff based on a preliminary finding of anticompetitive effects, relieving the burden of establishing market power and shifting the burden to the defendant to provide justification. 61 There are two formidable ways by which a plaintiff could challenge the NCAA's no-pay rules under section 1 of the Sherman Act. The first is to contend that the no-pay rules represent a form of wage fixing that harms not only the market for student-athlete services but also the quality of college sports' on-field product. The second is to argue that the NCAA rules constitute an illegal group boycott of those colleges that would otherwise compete in a free market to recruit student-athletes.
Under both legal theories, courts would likely review the NCAA's no-pay rules under the full rule of reason test because NCAA members "share an interest in making the entire league successful and profitable" and thus collectively benefit from cooperating on "the production and scheduling of games." 63 Under the wage-fixing theory, student-athletes would be the ideal plaintiffs to challenge the NCAA's restraints; meanwhile, under the group-boycott theory, the ideal plaintiff would be an NCAA member. demonstrated and thus required "some competitive justification" from the defendant); see also 
A. Challenging the NCAA's No-Pay Rules As Illegal Wage-Fixing Restraints
The argument that the NCAA's no-pay rules constitute illegal wage fixing is best supported by precedent from the Supreme Court and the Tenth Circuit. As cases in these courts explain, wage fixing involves any agreement by two or more employers to set the compensation rate of workers at a pre-specified amount. 64 Generally, courts find wage fixing to be illegal not only because it harms workers but also because it injures the competitive marketplace by driving workers away from their current line of employment and into another field where their work product is less valuable to society. 65 Furthermore, courts generally recognize that an agreement to fix employee wages outside the scope of a collective bargaining agreement illegally "restrain[s] mobility on the part of employees who would otherwise have the opportunity, in a competitive market for services, to transfer to higher paid opportunities [that otherwise would be] offered by others." 66 Applying these well-established principles, the Tenth Circuit held in Law v. NCAA 67 that the NCAA's attempt to cap assistant coaches' salaries was illegal because it depressed coaches' compensation without promoting any legitimate antitrust goal. 68 The court concluded that it was irrelevant whether the NCAA salary restraint opened up coaching opportunities for newer coaches because this rationale related entirely to social preferences that are divorced from 69 Likewise, the court rejected the argument that a salary cap was beneficial to the free market because it would cut all NCAA members' costs: "cost-cutting by itself is not a valid procompetitive justification" and "[i]f it were, any group of competing buyers [would then be allowed to] agree on maximum prices." 70 There is, of course, one important distinction between the court's holding in Law and a theoretical antitrust challenge posited against the NCAA's student-athlete no-pay rules: unlike assistant coaches, student-athletes have not traditionally been defined as employees, so the collective determination of their pay has not traditionally been construed as wage fixing. 71 Nevertheless, any empirical observation of student-athletes' daily activities shows that student-athletes are closely akin in practice to traditional workers. 72 For example, "a selfstudy performed by the NCAA in 2011" found that "Division I [college] football players [devoted] an average of 43.3 hours per week to their sport"-more time than they spent on academic activities, and more than a typical U.S. worker spends on his profession. 73 In addition, student-athletes seem to meet the Internal Revenue Service's multifactor test for employment because NCAA coaching staffs exercise year-round behavioral controls over student-athletes and impose strict limits on their outside financial activities. 74 Furthermore, in the context of workers' compensation law, at least 69. Id. at 1021-22 ("While opening up coaching positions for younger people may have social value apart from its affect [sic] on competition, we may not consider such values unless they impact upon competition.").
70.
Id. at 1022 (explaining further that setting maximum prices generally "reduces the incentive among suppliers to improve their products" in the context of college basketball coaches, and it would similarly create "less incentive to improve their performance if their salaries are capped"). Also, the court rejected the argument that the cap on certain coaches' salaries was needed to maintain competitive balance among teams because, " one court has issued an award to a student-athlete-thus treating him as a de facto employee. 75 All of these factors combine to significantly rebut the longstanding legal fiction advanced by the NCAA that studentathletes are foremost students and not workers. Indeed, there is even some evidence that this legal fiction was created by the NCAA for the specific purpose of trying to avoid antitrust scrutiny. 76 Thus, it would be the most bizarre of loopholes to allow the NCAA to evade antitrust scrutiny simply by applying a dubious label to their business practices. 77
B. Challenging the NCAA's No-Pay Rules As an Illegal Group Boycott
There is also a strong argument that the NCAA's no-pay rules constitute an illegal group boycott against colleges that would otherwise seek to pay their student-athletes. 78 In contrast to the wagefixing argument, the group-boycott argument is strongest if brought by an NCAA member, given the well-established precedent that members of private associations have antitrust standing to sue their associations. 79 75. See id. at 1103 (citing Univ. of Denver v. Nemeth, 257 P.2d 423 (Colo.
1953)) (holding that a student-athlete's award of worker's compensation benefits was proper because the injuries to his back sustained during football practice arose out of and in the course of employment).
See
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 71, at 74 (arguing that the NCAA self-coined the term "student-athlete" to perpetuate a myth of amateurism and "obtain the astonishing pecuniary gain and related benefits of the athletes' talents, time, and energy"). 81 The Court further implied that any attempt to ban an NCAA member for refusing to comply with its television bylaws was tantamount to an illegal group boycott because it prevented NCAA membership for those colleges seeking to compete in the free market for broadcast revenues. 82 The litigation in Board of Regents was long and complex, lasting for more than three years. At the district court level, the court held that the NCAA's television bylaws represented an illegal restraint on output, and that the NCAA, in its allocation of television rights, illegally "maintain[ed] mechanisms for punishing cartel members who [sought] to stray from these production quotas." 83 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concurring that "[t]he television plan at issue . . . restrict[ed] the plaintiffs' revenues, market share, and output," 84 potential." 85 Thus, even if the NCAA restraint had not affected output, the appellate court still would have found the threat of expelling noncomplying members to require careful scrutiny under a full rule of reason analysis. 86 Thereafter, the Supreme Court similarly ruled that the NCAA's television plan was illegal because it "eliminates competitors from the market, since only those broadcasters able to bid on television rights covering the entire NCAA can compete." 87 In addition, the Court explained that "when there is an agreement in terms of price or output, 'no elaborate industry analysis is needed to demonstrate the anticompetitive characteristics of such agreement.'" 88
Other Instructive Supreme Court Opinions
Although the Supreme Court's ruling in Board of Regents focused mostly on output restraints, several other Supreme Court decisions unrelated to college sports touch more directly on the conclusion that trade associations may not serve as "extra-judicial tribunals." 89 For instance, in Fashion Originators Guild of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 90 the Supreme Court affirmed a Federal Trade Commission decree that enjoined members of a fashion trade association from combining "among themselves to combat and . . . destroy all competition from the sale of garments which are copies of their 'original creators.'" 91 In finding the trade association's self-governance to be illegal, the Court explained that members of a trade association may not collectively agree to boycott other members for failing to follow association rules, nor may they issue "heavy fines" 85. Id. at 1161 (finding that plaintiffs' claim of an output restraint was per se illegal, and their group boycott claim was subject to the full rule of reason inquiry). . . freedom of action in the matter of employing seamen and agree[ ] to abide by the will of the associations." 94 There, the Court presumed that any combination among competitors to govern the terms of employment for an entire industry violated the Sherman Act. 95 The guiding principles of both Fashion Originators and Anderson further call into doubt the NCAA's attempt to impose a selfregulatory regime that mandates members not pay their studentathletes. This is because, much like the earlier self-governance regimes that the Supreme Court rejected as illegal, the NCAA controls nearly all of the businesses in its trade-making a member's ban from the association a significant hardship. 96 In addition, as one district court opinion has explained, "it is clear from the evidence that an institution which withdraws or is expelled from the NCAA could no longer operate a fully-rounded intercollegiate athletic program." 97 Because "[n]on-member institutions could not compete in the prestigious NCAA championship events . . . [t]hey would therefore be unable to recruit quality athletes into their programs." 98 Thus, "[a]s a practical matter, membership in the NCAA is a prerequisite for institutions wishing to sponsor a major, well-rounded athletic program." 99 Another line of Supreme Court decisions outlaws trade associations from enforcing "absolute ban[s] on competitive bidding"-an additional aspect of the NCAA's group boycott. 100 101 the Supreme Court nullified an engineering trade association's canon of ethics that prevented members from securing contracts by offering a lower price than their competitors for a given job. 102 Noting that "[t]he Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services," the Court explained that any attempts to prevent companies from competing on the attribute of price was unreasonable. 103 Moreover, the Court found it entirely irrelevant that the engineering firms were still able to compete on other factors given that only one important factor (price) had been removed. 104 This conclusion, expressed so cogently by the Supreme Court in Professional Engineers, would lead to the same inevitable conclusion regarding the NCAA's principle of amateurism: that it is illegal because it prevents its members from engaging in competitive "bidding" to recruit student-athletes. 105 Furthermore, the fact that Professional Engineers involved the selling of services-compared to the NCAA's no-pay rules, which affect the purchase of servicesmakes no difference under the law because, from an economic perspective, monopoly and monopsony markets lead to similar risks of consumer harm. 106 the ordinary give and take of the market place' and . . . deprives . . . customer[s] of 'the ability to utilize and compare prices in selecting engineering services'" (quoting 404 F. Supp. 457, 460 (D.D.C. 1975))). suggests that similar legal standards should apply to claims of monopolization and to claims of monopsonization."); see also Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061-62 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (discussing the harms of wage fixing in a monopsony market as being much the same as price fixing in a monopoly market); cf. Leroy, supra note 73, at 1087 (explaining that "[w]hile monopoly controls pricing by limiting competition to sell a product or a service, a monopsony controls pricing by limiting purchasing competition").
IV. Why Lower Court Decisions Finding the NCAA's Eligibility Rules to Be Noncommercial Are Either Inapposite or Wrongly Decided
Despite the favorable Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent discussed in Part III, not all of today's case law clearly supports finding the NCAA's no-pay rules illegal. Indeed, eight lower courts within the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits have contrarily held that the NCAA's "eligibility" rules are exempt from antitrust scrutiny because these rules do not affect "trade or commerce" and thus fail to meet one of the threshold requirements for antitrust scrutiny. 107 These decisions, however, rely on inaccurate factual presumptions about the NCAA and outdated interpretations of antitrust law that have since been rejected by the Supreme Court. Thus, although these decisions survive as a deviant strain of precedent within three federal circuits, they cannot survive the Supreme Court's current antitrust jurisprudence.
A. A Brief Discussion of the Eight Lower Court Decisions Finding the NCAA Eligibility Rules to Be Noncommercial
The first lower court to hold the NCAA's eligibility rules noncommercial and thus exempt from antitrust scrutiny was the District of New Jersey in its 1974 ruling, College Athletic Placement Service, Inc. v. NCAA. 108 There, the plaintiff-a company that helped young athletes find college scholarships-brought suit to enjoin the NCAA from enforcing an amateurism bylaw that prevented studentathletes from paying companies that assisted with the finding of scholarship opportunities. 109 Without ruling directly on the competitive merits, the court held that the legal challenge presented in the case did not come within the purview of the Sherman Act because it served merely to "preserv[e] the educational standards in its member institutions." 110 The following year, the District of Massachusetts decided a similar case, Jones v. NCAA, 113 also citing Marjorie Webster to support finding an NCAA bylaw exempt from antitrust scrutiny. 114 The dispute in Jones related to whether the NCAA could deem a college hockey player ineligible for competition based on the player's previous receipt of an athletic stipend. 115 The court concluded that the plaintiff could not challenge the NCAA's rule banning such a player because the plaintiff did not show how "the actions of the [NCAA] in setting eligibility guidelines ha[d] any nexus to commercial or business activities in which the defendant might engage." 116 In addition, the court noted that even if the claim was not barred on noncommercial grounds, the NCAA still did not act with sufficient "scienter" to violate antitrust law. 117 Thereafter in Gaines v. NCAA, 118 the Middle District of Tennessee similarly held that a plaintiff wishing to return to college football after entering the NFL draft could not bring an antitrust challenge against the NCAA. 119 The Gaines decision was reached six years after the Supreme Court ruled favorably for the plaintiffs in Board of Regents. 120 Nevertheless, the court differentiated the case by noting a legal difference "between the NCAA's efforts to restrict the 112. Id. at 656. Nevertheless, the proposition relied on in Marjorie Webster Junior College was decidedly different from that in College Athletic Placement Service, as the latter restraint did far more than just cause the plaintiffs to suffer social stigma; it entirely precluded the plaintiffs from maintaining their business relationships. televising of college football games and the NCAA's efforts to maintain a discernible line between amateurism and professionalism." 121 Thus, the court adopted a bifurcated test to determine whether NCAA conduct affects interstate commerce, placing "business rules" (such as the television policy) on one side of an imaginary line and "eligibility rules" (such as those related to amateurism) on the other side. 122 Then in 1998, the Third Circuit formally adopted Gaines's bifurcated test for NCAA commerciality in another case, Smith v. NCAA. 123 Smith involved a plaintiff's challenge to an NCAA bylaw that prohibited a student-athlete from participating in intercollegiate athletics while attending a graduate school different from the one where she attended college. 124 Citing College Athletic Placement Services, Jones, and Gaines, the court found this particular bylaw immune from competitive scrutiny because "many district courts have [already] held that the Sherman Act does not apply to the NCAA's promulgation and enforcement of eligibility requirements." 125 After Smith, "[t]he parade marched on" with two other Third Circuit rulings that found the NCAA's eligibility rules to be noncommercial and thus exempt from review. 126 In Bowers v. NCAA, 127 the District of New Jersey held that the NCAA bylaws that determine academic eligibility lie outside the Sherman Act's reach because Third Circuit precedent indicated that those bylaws are "not Finally and most recently in Bassett v. NCAA, 131 the Sixth Circuit followed the Third Circuit's lead when it adopted a bifurcated test for evaluating whether NCAA conduct is sufficiently commercial to fall within the scope of the Sherman Act. 132 The dispute in Bassett specifically involved the legality of an NCAA mandate requiring that any college wishing to hire a coach who previously engaged in recruiting violations to first receive permission from the NCAA Committee on Infractions. 133 Ultimately, the court found the rule was noncommercial, even though the court acknowledged that the NCAA itself was a commercial actor. 134 The court proceeded to describe the NCAA coaching restraint as "anti-commercial" because, if not for the rule, any NCAA member that wanted to hire a coach who had engaged in previous NCAA recruiting infractions could obtain "a decided competitive advantage in recruiting and retaining highly prized student athletes." 135
B. Why Each of These Eight Cases Was Wrongly Decided
In a vacuum, each of these eight decisions seems to present a strong basis for finding the NCAA's no-pay rules to be noncommercial (or, as Bassett would argue, anti-commercial) and thus valid under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Nevertheless, each of these decisions suffers from at least one, if not multiple, defects in its analysis.
The first major defect with the above decisions arises from the premise first adopted in College Athletic Placement Service that the NCAA is noncommercial based on its status as an association Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64 · Issue 1·2013 Why the NCAA's No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act 87 involved in higher education. 136 However, at the time College Athletic Placement Service was decided, this issue was not well settled. 137 Indeed, it was not until the very next year that the Supreme Court held in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 138 that "[t]he nature of an occupation, standing alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act." 139 Thus, the Court's decision in Goldfarb implicitly overruled College Athletic Placement Service by confirming that "the exchange of [a] service for money is [always] 'commerce' in the most common usage of that word"-even if the service involved a learned profession. 140 Thereafter in Board of Regents, the Supreme Court identified the NCAA's restraint on television broadcasts as being commercial without even addressing the issue, seemingly bringing further closure to any argument that these associations involved in higher education are innately noncommercial. 141 Another notable defect with many of these rulings is that they cite Jones v. NCAA 142 -a case in which the court not only ruled in favor of the NCAA based on the rejected educational exception but also based on the NCAA's purported lack of "scienter." 143 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never found lack of "scienter" to be a factor precluding an antitrust inquiry on the merits. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has long endorsed the principle that "[n]either the fact that [a] conspiracy may be intended to promote the 137. Cf. id. at *5 ("It is possible to conceive of restrictions on eligibility for accreditation that could have little other than a commercial motive; and as such, antitrust policy would presumably be applicable."). Case Western Reserve Law Review· Volume 64 · Issue 1·2013 Why the NCAA's No-Pay Rules Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act 88 public welfare, or that of the industry . . . is sufficient [grounds] to avoid the penalties of the Sherman Act." 144 A third defect with many of these cases is that they interpret the threshold issue of "interstate commerce" based on a particular bylaw rather than the NCAA's overall business activities. However, the Supreme Court explained in McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc. 145 that the only thing a plaintiff must demonstrate to meet the threshold issue of "interstate commerce" is a "substantial effect on interstate commerce generated by [a defendant's general business activities]." 146 Thus, the bylaw-specific evaluation of the NCAA's conduct has been flatly rejected. 147 Moreover, from a factual perspective, many of these cases rely on faulty presumptions about the NCAA. For example, many of the aforementioned decisions imply that college athletics operate just like other educational programs. 148 But contrary to all other educational programs, "intercollegiate athletics in its management is clearly business, and big business at that." 149 For example, in 2010, a twelveteam athletic conference collected more than $1 billion in athletic receipts. 150 That same year, CBS paid more than $750 million to 146. See id. at 242-43 (holding with regard to "respondents' brokerage activity" and rejecting the contention that the plaintiffs were required to make a "more particularized showing" as to "the alleged conspiracy to fix commission rates, or . . . other aspects of respondents' activity") While the disputed issue in McLain primarily related to the "interstate" aspect rather than the "commerce" aspect of "interstate commerce," the inquiry was nevertheless performed together, leading to the logical result that the court intended a review of both components in the gestalt rather than based on just a single bylaw. See id.
Id.
("If establishing jurisdiction required a showing that the unlawful conduct itself had an effect on interstate commerce, jurisdiction would be defeated by a demonstration that the alleged restraint failed to have its intended anticompetitive effect. This is not the rule of our cases."). 150. See Branch, supra note 35, at 82 (explaining that in 2010, the "footballcrazed" Southeastern Conference became the first college athletic conference to collect more than $1 billion in revenues, and the Big Ten Conference trailed closely behind at $905 million).
purchase the television broadcast rights to the NCAA men's basketball tournament. 151 Meanwhile, an increasing number of college athletic departments receive millions of dollars per year from selling their stadium advertising rights, selling advertising space on players' equipment, and using players' names in licensed videogames. 152 All of these factors clearly indicate that college athletics has become "big business" and, by all accounts, a commercial actor. 153 Finally, also as a factual matter, many of the rulings that have found the NCAA to be noncommercial turn for support to language in the NCAA's own bylaws denoting the association's purported amateur status. However, any reliance on the NCAA's own bylaws leads to a misleading result. As the Supreme Court has previously noted, "[a]n ongoing § 1 violation cannot evade § 1 scrutiny simply by giving the ongoing violation a name and label." 154 If the opposite were true, all trade associations would simply define their activities as amateurism as a way to circumvent the antitrust laws.
V. Why Lower Court Decisions Holding the NCAA Eligibility Rules to Be Procompetitive Are Similarly Misguided
In addition to the aforementioned cases, four lower court decisions have upheld NCAA rules related to eligibility under the rule of reason based on their purported procompetitive benefits. 155 noncommercial, each of these four additional decisions suffers from one or more legal defects.
A. Cases Finding the NCAA Eligibility Rules Are Procompetitive
The first decision to find an NCAA eligibility rule, although commercial, to be procompetitive was the Fifth Circuit's 1977 ruling in Hennessey v. NCAA. 156 There, the court held that a challenge to the NCAA's limit on the number of coaches per team "come[s] close, but fall[s] short" under a rule of reason analysis. 157 In finding the limit on coaches to be procompetitive, the court explained that the rule had a reasonable "motive" of assisting colleges with less funding to "preserve and foster competition" on equal terms. 158 Thus, the court expressed fear that if it did not uphold the NCAA's bylaw, a war of attrition would ensue, resulting in some colleges devoting all of their resources to college athletics. 159 Six years later in Justice v. NCAA, 160 the District of Arizona upheld an NCAA bylaw that had disqualified the University of Arizona football team from competing in postseason play after its players accepted prohibited benefits such as free transportation and lodging. 161 In upholding the team's ban from postseason play, the Justice court explained that the NCAA postseason eligibility rules were procompetitive because they "have been shown to lack an anticompetitive purpose and to be directly related to the NCAA objectives of preserving amateurism and promoting fair competition." 162 In addition, the court noted that "NCAA regulations designed to preserve amateurism and fair competition have previously been upheld as reasonable restraints [of trade] under the rule of reason"-citing Hennessey, Jones, and even Athletic Placement Service, Inc. 163 Thereafter, the Fifth Circuit held in its 1988 decision McCormack v. NCAA 164 that a college football player's challenge to the NCAA death penalty failed under the rule of reason. 165 football player's challenge, the court differentiated its holding from that of Board of Regents by quoting that case for the proposition that, unlike rules that govern television broadcast markets, rules that determine who is eligible to compete in college football games "enhance public interest in intercollegiate athletics" and support an "academic tradition" that lies at the core of the unique character of college athletics. 166 The court further quoted Board of Regents for the proposition that "[i]t is reasonable to assume that most of the regulatory controls of the NCAA are justifiable means of fostering competition," and that one of the NCAA rules that can be viewed as procompetitive is "athletes must get paid." 167 Finally, the Seventh Circuit held in Banks v. NCAA 168 that the NCAA bylaws that prevent student-athletes from exploring professional opportunities were procompetitive based on the same Board of Regents language that was cited by McCormack. 169 Banks further described the plaintiff's antitrust claim as "absurd" because, in the court's opinion, "the NCAA does not exist as a minor league training ground for future NFL players but rather to provide an opportunity for competition among amateur students pursuing a collegiate education." 170
B. Why Each of These Four Cases Was Wrongly Decided
Much like the eight decisions that found the NCAA to be noncommercial, these four decisions finding NCAA eligibility rules to be procompetitive are easily rebutted based on their substantial analytical errors. For example, the very first decision to find an NCAA eligibility rule to be procompetitive, Hennessey v. NCAA, 171 ruled in this manner primarily because the NCAA rule kept member costs down. 172 Another defect with the Hennessey decision is that, much like Jones, Hennessey focused extensively on the NCAA's "motive" of allowing colleges, irrespective of their athletic funding, to compete on equal terms. 177 Although such analysis at one time may have been within the bounds of an acceptable rule of reason inquiry, the Supreme Court clarified in Professional Engineers that any proper rule of reason analysis must turn on the competitive significance of the restraint rather than whether the restraint is "in the interest of the members of [the] industry." 178 Thus, even a positive, noneconomic motive can no longer save an otherwise illegal restraint.
The court's analysis in Justice made the similar error of relying on social benefits rather than procompetitive effects. 179 There, the plaintiffs on appeal suggested that recognizing such benefits 173. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
174.
Id. at 304, 341 (applying the Sherman Act to a railroad price-fixing agreement-which defendants claimed benefited "patrons of the railway line . . . and the public at large"-and stating that an agreement's "violation of law [cannot] be made valid by allegation of good intention or of desire to simply maintain reasonable rates"). Furthermore, the court held that intent is not an element that requires proof in an antitrust case. McCormack presented a very different type of problem for the courts, as the factual background in that case was somewhat bizarre. 183 The party most directly harmed by the NCAA's death penalty sanction-Southern Methodist University-had previously agreed to accept the sanction and thus was not a party to the case. 184 Meanwhile, the original plaintiff was merely an alumnus of the school and his claim was rejected due to lack of standing. 185 As a result, the court was left to grapple with the claims of the football player plaintiffs, who were initially joined to the case by McCormack solely as a way to try to preserve his standing. 186 In addressing the football players' claims, the McCormack court properly turned to Board of Regents as the most appropriate precedent. 187 However-perhaps troubled by the bizarre posture of the case-the court gerrymandered the language in Board of Regents to rule in favor of the NCAA. 188 For example, the language quoted by McCormack to support its finding that the NCAA's death-penalty sanction was procompetitive actually came from a section of Board of Regents that explained why NCAA conduct should be reviewed under the full rule of reason rather than the per se test. 189 Even more troublesome, the exact language from that case actually states that the NCAA's amateurism rules should be analyzed under the full rule of reason by a court because they "can be viewed as procompetitive." 190 By using the word "can" rather than "must" and using it in the context of determining the proper test for reviewing NCAA conduct, it is not clear that the Board of Regents court concluded the NCAA's no-pay rules were procompetitive. 191 and others of 'their right to associate together in support of the University by attendance at the football games of the University,' while the football players have been 'forced to discontinue their athleteacademic duties' at SMU and the cheerleaders have lost the opportunity to lead cheers at football games"). actual language in Board of Regents never truly supported McCormack's conclusion. 192 Finally, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Banks likewise misconstrued the language in Board of Regents to reach a conclusion starkly different from the Supreme Court's inference in that case. 193 This error was pointed out by Judge Joel Flaum in a vigorous dissent, in which he concluded that "the market at issue here is the college football labor market" and "[i]f the no-draft rule were scuttled, colleges that promised their athletes the opportunity to test the waters in the NFL draft . . . would be more attractive to athletes than colleges that declined to offer the same opportunity." 194 Thereafter, Justice Harry Blackmun, in reviewing a bench memorandum assessing whether to grant certiorari in Banks, opined by hand on his memo that "CA7 got this one dead wrong." 195 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ultimately declined certioraripreventing Justice Blackmun from coining an opinion that would have potentially overturned Banks and its progeny. 196
VI. Why Closer Game Scores Cannot Save the NCAA No-Pay Rules but May Support Preserving Such Rules on a Conference-by-Conference Basis
Finally, even beyond the above decisions that have granted unusually broad deference to the NCAA rules, numerous other sources, including law review articles and newspaper editorials, argue in favor of the NCAA no-pay rules for yet another reason-they improve the quality of college sports contests by keeping game scores 202 Without going into the competitive merits of a restraint that helps to equalize game results (a topic perhaps worthy of an entirely separate article), that argument does little to save the NCAA's nopay rules because there are other, less restrictive ways that colleges can level the sports playing field short of imposing a national, industry-wide bar on student-athlete compensation. For example, colleges could just as easily implement salary caps at the conference level rather than at the league level. 203 Given that most college sporting events are played by teams from within a single conference, a conference-wide salary cap would have much the same effect of 197. See LeRoy, supra note 73, at 1093 (explaining that labor restraints on college sports markets have procompetitive effects by "spreading, and preserving in place, the supply of talented players and making games more interesting"); see also David Brooks, The Amateur Ideal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2011, at A35 (commenting that no-pay rules force an "obsessively competitive group, to pay homage to academic pursuits" and that "college basketball is more thrilling than pro basketball because the game is still animated by amateur passions, not coldly calculating professional interests").
game tickets, apparel, and other paraphernalia from those particular conferences. 208
Conclusion
Over the past century, NCAA members have enjoyed immense profits by enforcing a principle of amateurism that keeps the revenues of college athletics away from student-athletes. 209 But even though this principle of amateurism has become well embedded in the NCAA's identity, it does not comport with traditional principles of antitrust law and free trade. To the contrary, the NCAA's principle of amateurism likely violates section 1 of the Sherman Act by artificially prohibiting student-athlete pay and by eliminating from the college sports marketplace those colleges that wish to recruit top studentathletes.
Although eight lower courts have found the NCAA's eligibility rules to be noncommercial and thus exempt from the Sherman Act, each of these decisions is wrongly decided. Many of these decisions ignore Supreme Court precedent explaining that competitive restraints in educational markets are to be viewed identically to competitive restraints in all other markets. Meanwhile, many other decisions disregard persuasive factual evidence indicating that college sports today have become a multibillion-dollar enterprise that engages in "interstate commerce." Furthermore, four lower courts have held that the NCAA eligibility rules survive under the rule of reason inquiry based on these rules' purported procompetitive benefits. Nevertheless, these decisions are similarly flawed. Most of these decisions that find NCAA eligibility rules to be procompetitive focus on the rules' original intent, impact on member costs, and social policy goals-all factors that the Supreme Court has found to be irrelevant to a proper antitrust analysis. Moreover, some of these rulings have been expressly called into doubt by Judge Blackmun's handwritten comments in Banks-leaving open the possibility that the Supreme Court does not agree with that case's outcome.
Of course, a proper antitrust analysis does not necessarily prohibit all agreements among colleges with respect to student-athlete 208. See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) ("[The Sherman Act] rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest materials progress . . . .").
209. See Edelman, supra note 5, at 864-65 (noting that the wealth generated by college athletics remains in the hands of a select few administrators, athletic directors, and coaches because student-athletes are prevented from profiting based upon their athletic abilities).
